An agent's will is weak if he acts, and acts intentionally, counter to his own best judgement; in such cases we sometimes say he lacks the willpower to do what he knows, or at any rate believes, would, everything considered, be better.
It will be convenient to call actions of this kind incontinent actions, or to say that in doing them the agent acts incontinently. In using this terminology I depart from tradition, at least in making the class of incontinent actions larger than usual. But it is the larger class I want to discuss, and I believe it includes all of the actions some philosophers have called incontinent, and some of the actions many philosophers have called incontinent.
Let me explain how my conception of incontinence is more general than some others. It is often made a condition of an incontinent action that it be performed despite the agent's knowledge that another course of action is better. I count such actions incontinent, but the puzzle I shall discuss depends only on the attitude or belief of the agent, so it would restrict the field to no purpose to insist on knowledge. Knowledge also has an unneeded, and hence unwanted, flavour of the cognitive; my subject concerns evaluative judgements, whether they are analysed cognitively, prescriptively, or otherwise. So even the concept of belief is perhaps too special, and I shall speak of what the agent judges or holds.
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If a man holds some course of action to be the best one, everything considered, or the right one, or the thing he ought to do, and yet does something else, he acts incontinently. But I would also say he acts incontinently provided he holds some available course of action to be better on the whole than the one he takes; or that, as between some other course of action which he believes open to him (p.22) and the action he performs, he judges that he ought to perform the other. In other words, comparative judgements suffice for incontinence. We may now characterize an action that reveals weakness of the will or incontinence: D. In doing x an agent acts incontinently if and only if: (a) the agent does x intentionally; (b) the agent believes there is an alternative action y open to him; and (c) the agent judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than to do x.
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There seem to be incontinent actions in this sense. The difficulty is that their existence challenges another doctrine that has an air of self-evidence: that, in so far as a person acts intentionally he acts, as Aquinas puts it, in the light of some imagined good. This view does not, as it stands, directly contradict the claim that there are incontinent actions. But it is hard to deny that the considerations that recommend this view recommend also a relativized version: in so far as a person acts intentionally he acts in the light of what he imagines (judges) to be the better.
It will be useful to spell out this claim in the form of two principles. The first expresses the natural assumption about the relation between wanting or desiring something, and action. 'The primitive sign of wanting is trying to get', says Anscombe in Intention.
2 Hampshire comes closer to exactly what I need when he writes, in Freedom of the Individual, 3 that 'A wants to do X' is equivalent to 'other things being equal, he would do X, if he could'. Here I take (possibly contrary to Hampshire's intent) 'other things being equal' to mean, or anyway to allow, the interpretation, 'provided there P1. If an agent wants to do x more than he wants to do y and he believes himself free to do either x or y, then he will intentionally do x if he does either x or y intentionally.
The second principle connects judgements of what it is better to do with motivation or wanting:
P2. If an agent judges that it would be better to do x than to do y, then he wants to do x more than he wants to do y.
P1 and P2 together obviously entail that if an agent judges that it would be better for him to do x than to do y, and he believes himself to be free to do either x or y, then he will intentionally do x if he does either x or y intentionally. This conclusion, I suggest, appears to show that it is false that:
P3. There are incontinent actions.
Someone who is convinced that P1-P3 form an inconsistent triad, but who finds only one or two of the principles really persuasive, will have no difficulty deciding what to say. But for someone (like myself) to whom the principles expressed by P1-P3 seem selfevident, the problem posed by the apparent contradiction is acute enough to be called a paradox. I cannot agree with Lemmon when he writes, in an otherwise admirable article, 'Perhaps akrasia is one of the best examples of a pseudo-problem in philosophical literature: in view of its existence, if you find it a problem you have already made a philosophical mistake.' 4 If your assumptions lead to a contradiction, no doubt you have made a mistake, but since you can know you have made a mistake without knowing what the mistake is, your problem may be real.
The attempted solutions with which I am familiar to the problem created by the initial plausibility of P1-P3 assume that P1-P3 do really contradict one another. These attempts naturally end by giving up one or another of the principles. I am not very happy about P1-P3 as I have stated them: perhaps it is easy to doubt whether they are true in just their present form (particularly P1 and P2 Aristotle's view was, it is safe to say that he tried to solve our problem by distinguishing two senses in which a man may be said to know (or believe) that one thing is better than another; one sense makes P2 true, while the other sense is needed in the definition of incontinence. The flavour of this second sense is given by Aristotle's remark that the incontinent man has knowledge 'in the sense in which having knowledge does not mean knowing but only talking, as a drunken man may mutter the verses of Empedocles' (Nic. Eth., 1147b).
Perhaps it is evident that there is a considerable range of actions, similar to incontinent actions in one respect or another, where we may speak of self-deception, insincerity, mauvaise foi, hypocrisy, unconscious desires, motives and intentions, and so on. 11 There is in fact a very great temptation, in working on this subject, to play the amateur psychologist. We are dying to say: remember the enormous variety of ways a man can believe or hold something, or know it, or want something, or be afraid of it, or do something. We can act as if we knew something, and yet profoundly doubt it; we can act at the limit of our capacity and at the same time stand off like an observer and say to ourselves, 'What an odd thing to do.' We can desire things and tell ourselves we hate them. These half-states and contradictory states are common, and full of interest to the philosopher. No doubt they explain, or at least point to a way of describing without contradiction, many cases where we find ourselves talking of weakness of the will or of incontinence. But we ourselves show a certain weakness (p.29) as philosophers if we do not go on to ask: does every case of incontinence involve one of the shadowzones where we want both to apply, and to withhold, some mental predicate? Does it never happen that I have an unclouded, unwavering judgement that my action is not for the best, all things considered, and yet where the action I do perform has no hint of compulsion or of the compulsive? There is no proving such actions exist; but it seems to me absolutely certain that they do. And if this is so, no amount of attention to the subtle borderline bits of behaviour will resolve the central problem. Austin complains that in discussing the present topic, we are prone to ' . . . collapse succumbing to temptation into losing control of ourselves . . . ' He elaborates:
Plato, I suppose, and after him Aristotle, fastened this confusion upon us, as bad in its day and way as the later, grotesque, confusion of moral weakness with weakness of will. I am very partial to ice cream, and a bombe is served divided into segments corresponding one to one with persons at High Table: I am tempted to help myself to two segments and do, thus succumbing to temptation and even conceivably (but why necessarily?) going against my principles. But do I lose control of myself? Do I raven, do I snatch the morsels from the dish and wolf them down, impervious to the consternation of my colleagues? Not a bit of it. We often succumb to temptation with calm and even with finesse.
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We succumb to temptation with calm; there are also plenty of cases where we act against our better judgement and which cannot be described as succumbing to temptation.
In the usual accounts of incontinence there are, it begins to appear, two quite different themes that interweave and tend to get confused. One is, that desire distracts us from the good, or forces us to the bad; the other is that incontinent action always favours the beastly, selfish passion over the call of duty and morality. That these two themes can be separated was emphasized by Plato both in the Protagoras and the Philebus when he showed that the hedonist, on nothing but his own pleasure bent, could go against his own best (p.30) judgement as easily as anyone else. Mill makes the same point, though presumably from a position more sympathetic to the hedonist: 'Men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be the less valuable; and this no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures than when it is between bodily and mental.' (Utilitarianism, Chap. 11.) Unfortunately, Mill goes on to spoil the effect of his point by adding, 'They pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that health is the greater good.' In the simplest case, we imagine that the agent has a desire, for example, to know the time. He realizes that by looking at his watch he will satisfy his desire; so he looks at his watch.
We can answer the question why he looked at his watch; we know the intention with which he did it. Following Aristotle, the desire may be conceived as a principle of action, and its natural propositional expression would here be something like 'It would be good for me to know the time' or, even more It seems that, given this desire and this belief, the agent is in a position to infer that looking at his watch is desirable, and in fact the making of such an inference is something it would be natural to describe as subsuming the case under the rule. But given the desire and this belief, the conditions are also satisfied that lead to (and hence explain) an intentional action, so Aristotle says that once a person has the desire and believes some action will satisfy it, straightway he acts. Since there is no distinguishing the conditions under which an agent is in a position to infer that an action he is free to perform is desirable from the conditions under which he acts, Aristotle apparently identifies drawing the inference and acting: he says, 'the conclusion is an action'. But of course this account of intentional action and practical reason contradicts the assumption that there are incontinent actions. really is a modification) we would still have to explain why in some cases the desire and belief caused an action, while in other cases they merely led to the judgement that a course of action was desirable.
The incontinent man believes it would be better on the whole to do something else, but he has a reason for what he does, for his (p.33) action is intentional. We must therefore be able to abstract from his behaviour and state of mind a piece of practical reasoning the conclusion of which is, or would be if the conclusion were drawn from the premises, that the action actually performed is desirable. Aristotle tends to obscure this point by concentrating on cases where the incontinent man behaves 'under the influence of rule and an opinion' (Nic. Eth., 1147b; cf. 1102b).
Aquinas is far clearer on this important point than Aristotle. He says:
He that has knowledge of the universal is hindered, because of a passion, from reasoning in the light of that universal, so as to draw the conclusion; but he reasons in the light of another universal proposition suggested by We can make the point more poignantly, though here we go beyond Aristotle and Aquinas, if we construe principles and conclusions as comparative judgements concerning the merits of committing, or not committing, the act in question. The two conclusions (C 1 ) and (C 2 ) will then be (given some natural assumptions): It is better not to perform this act than to perform it, and, It is better to perform this act than not to perform it. And these are in flat contradiction on the assumption that better-than is asymmetric. incontinent man, but also of the righteous man in the toils of temptation; one of them does the wrong thing and the other the right, but both act in the face of competing claims.
The situation is common; life is crowded with examples: I ought to do it because it will save a life, I ought not because it will be a lie; if I do it, I will break my word to Lavina, if I don't, I will break my word to Lolita; and so on. Anyone may find himself in this fix, whether he be upright or temporizing, weak-willed or strong. But then unless we take the line that moral principles cannot conflict in application to a case, we must give up the concept of the nature of practical reason we have so far been assuming. For how can premises, all of which are true (or acceptable), entail a contradiction?
It is astonishing that in contemporary moral philosophy this problem has received little attention, and no satisfactory treatment. Those who recognize the difficulty seem ready to accept one of two solutions: in effect they allow only a single ultimate moral principle; or they rest happy with the notion of a distinction between the prima facie desirable (good, obligatory, etc.) and the absolutely desirable (good, obligatory, etc). 17 I shall not argue the point here, but I do not believe any version of the 'single principle' solution, once its implications are understood, can be accepted: principles, or reasons for acting, are irreducibly multiple. On the other hand, it is not easy to see how to take advantage of the purported distinction between prima facie and absolute value. Suppose first that we try to think of (p.35) 'prima facie' as an attributive adverb, helping to form such predicates as 'x is prima facie good, right, obligatory' or 'x is better, prima facie, than y'. To avoid our recent trouble, we must suppose that 'x is better, prima facie, than y' does not contradict 'y is better, prima facie, than
x', and that 'x is prima facie right' does not contradict 'x is prima facie wrong'. But then the conclusion we can draw, in every case of conflict (and hence of incontinence) will be 'x is better, prima facie, than y, and y is better, prima facie, than x'. This comes down, as is clear from the structure practical reasoning would have on this assumption, to saying 'There is something to be said for, and something to be said against, doing so and so-and also for and against not doing it.' But now we are brought up against our other problem, the form or nature of practical reasoning. For nothing could be more obvious than that our third 'practical syllogism' is no syllogism at all; the conclusion simply doesn't follow by logic from the premises. And introducing the third piece of reasoning doesn't solve the problem we had before anyway:
we still have contradictory 'conclusions'. We (p.37) could at this point try once more introducing 'prima facie' in suitable places: for example, in (M 1 ), (M 2 ), (C 1 ), and (C 2 ). We might then try to relate prima facie desirability to desirability sans phrase by making (C 1 ) and (C 2 ), thus interpreted, the data for (C 3 ). But this is an unpromising line. We can hardly expect to learn whether an action ought to be performed simply from the fact that it is both prima facie right and prima facie wrong. conclusions colour. The trouble lies in the tacit assumption that moral principles have the form of universalized conditionals; once this assumption is made, nothing we can do with a prima facie operator in the conclusion will save things.
The situation is, in this respect, like reasoning from probabilistic evidence. As Hempel has emphasized with great clarity, 20 we cannot reason from:
(M4) If the barometer falls, it almost certainly will rain (m4) The barometer is falling to the conclusion:
(C4) It almost certainly will rain since we may at the same time be equally justified in arguing:
(M5) Red skies at night, it almost certainly won't rain (m5) The sky is red tonight
The crucial blunder is interpreting (M 4 ) and (M 5 ) to allow detachment of the modal conclusion. A way to mend matters is to view the 'almost certainly' of (M 4 ) and (M 5 ) as modifying, not the conclusion, but the connective. Thus we might render (M 4 ), 'That the barometer falls probabilizes that it will rain'; in symbols, 'pr(Rx, Fx)', where the variable ranges over areas of space-time that may be characterized by falling barometers or rain. If we let 'a' name the space and time of here and now, and 'Sx' mean that the early part of x is characterized by a red sky of evening, we may attempt to reconstruct the thought bungled above thus: (p.38)
pr (Rx,Fx) pr(∼Rx,Sx) Fa Sa ∴ pr (Ra,pr(Rx,Fx) and Fa) ∴ pr (∼Ra,pr(∼Rx,Sx) and Sa)
If we want to predict the weather, we will take a special interest in:
pr(∼Ra,e) or pr (Ra,e) where e is all the relevant evidence we have. But it is clear that we can infer neither of these from the two arguments that went before, our qualitative 'pr' we substitute a numerical measure of degree of support).
I propose to apply the pattern to practical reasoning in the obvious way. The central idea is that a moral principle, like 'Lying is (prima facie) wrong', cannot coherently be treated as a universally quantified conditional, but should be recognized to mean something like, 'That an act is a lie prima facie makes it wrong'; in symbols, 'pf(Wx,Lx)'. The concept of the prima facie, as it is needed in moral philosophy, relates propositions. In logical grammar, 'prima facie' is not an operator on single sentences, much less on predicates of actions, but on pairs of sentences related as (expressing) moral judgement and ground. Here is how the piece of practical reasoning misrepresented by (M 1 ), (m 1 ) and (C 1 ) might look when reconstituted:
(M 6 ) pf(x is better than y, x is a refraining from fornication and y is an act of fornication) (m 6 ) a is a refraining from fornication and b is an act of fornication ∴ (C 6 ) pf(a is better than b, (M 6 ) and (m 6 ))
Similarly, (M 2 ) and (m 2 ), when rewritten in the new mode, and labelled (M 7 ) and (m 7 ), will yield:
(C7) pf(b is better than a, (M 7 ) and (m 7 ))
A judgement in which we will take particular interest is:
where e is all the relevant considerations known to us, including at least (M 6 ), (m 6 ), (M 7 ), and (m 7 ).
Of course (C 8 ) does not follow logically from anything that went (p.39) before, but in this respect moral reasoning seems no worse off than predicting the weather. In neither case do we know a general formula for computing how far or whether a conjunction of evidence statements supports a conclusion from how far or whether each conjunct supports it. There is no loss either, in this respect, in our strategy of relativizing moral judgements: we have no clue how to arrive at (C 8 ) from the reasons, but its faulty prototype (C 3 ) was in no better shape.
There has, however, been a loss of relevance, for the conditionalization that keeps (C 6 ) from clashing with (C 7 ), and (C 8 ) from clashing with either, also insulates all three from action. Intentional action, I have argued in defending P1 and P2, is geared directly to unconditional judgements like 'It would be better to do a than to do b.' Reasoning that stops at conditional judgements such as (C 8 ) is practical only in its subject, not in its issue.
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Practical reasoning does however often arrive at unconditional judgements that one action is better than another-otherwise there would be no such thing as acting on a reason. The minimal elements of such reasoning are these: the agent accepts some reason (or set of reasons) r, and holds that pf(a is better than b, r), and these constitute the reason why he judges that a is better than b. Under these conditions, the agent will do a if he does either a or b intentionally, and his reason for doing a rather than b will be identical with the reason why he judges a better than b.
This modified account of acting on a reason leaves P1 and P2 untouched, and Aristotle's remark that the conclusion (of a piece of practical reasoning) is an action remains cogent. But now there is no (logical) difficulty in the fact of incontinence, for the akrates is characterized as holding that, all things considered, it would be better to do b than to do a, even though he does a rather than b and with a reason. The logical difficulty has vanished because a judgement that a is better than b, all things considered, is a relational, or pf, judgement, and so cannot conflict logically with any unconditional judgement.
Possibly it will be granted that P1-P3, as interpreted here, do not yield a contradiction. But at the same time, a doubt may arise whether P3 is plausible, given this interpretation. For how is it possible for a man to judge that a is better than b, all things considered, and not judge that a is better than b?
(p.40) One potential confusion is quickly set aside. 'a is better than b, all things (viz. all truths, moral and otherwise) considered' surely does entail 'a is better than b', and we do not want to explain incontinence as a simple logical blunder. The phrase 'all things considered' must, of course, refer only to things known, believed, or held by the agent, the sum of his relevant principles, opinions, attitudes, and desires. Setting this straight may, however, seem only to emphasize the real difficulty. We want now to ask: how is it possible for a man to judge that a is better than b on the grounds that r, and yet not judge that a is better than b, when r is the sum of all that seems relevant to him? When we say that r contains all that seems relevant to the agent, don't we just mean that nothing has been omitted that influences his judgement that a is better This shows we can make sense of incontinence without appeal to the idea of an agent's total wisdom, and the new formulation might in any case be considered an improvement on (D) since it allows (correctly, I think) that there are incontinent actions even when no judgement is made in the light of all the reasons. Still, we cannot rule out the case where a judgement is made in the light of all the reasons, so the underlying difficulty may be thought to remain.
In fact, however, the difficulty is not real. for doing a when he believes it would be better, all things considered, to do another thing, then the answer must be: for this, the agent has no reason. 25 We perceive a creature as rational in so far as we are able to view his movements as part of a rational pattern comprising also thoughts, desires, emotions, and volitions. (In this we are much aided by the actions we conceive to be utterances.) Through faulty inference, incomplete evidence, lack of diligence, or flagging sympathy, we often enough fail to detect a pattern that is there. But in the case of incontinence, the attempt to read reason into behaviour is necessarily subject to a degree of frustration.
What is special in incontinence is that the actor cannot understand himself: he recognizes, in his own intentional behaviour, something essentially surd.
Notes:
(1) In a useful article, G. Santas gives this account of incontinence: 'In a case of weakness a man does something that he knows or believes he should (ought) not do, or fails to do something that he knows or believes he should do, when the occasion and the opportunity for acting or refraining is present, and when it is in his power, in some significant sense, Oh, to vex me, contraries meet in one; Inconstancy unnaturally hath begot A constant habit; that when I would not I change in vows, and in devotion.
(7) Aristotle sometimes characterizes the incontinent man (the akrates) as 'abandoning his choice' (Nic. Eth., 1151a) or 'abandoning the conclusion he has reached' (1145b); but also often along the lines suggested here: 'he does the thing he knows to be evil' (1134b) or 'he is convinced that he ought to do one thing and nevertheless does another thing' (1146b). (10) Aquinas is excellent on this point. He clearly distinguishes between actions performed from a strong emotion, such as fear, which he allows are involuntary to a certain extent and hence not truly incontinent, and actions performed from concupiscence, for example: here, he says 'concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence. Therefore the effect of concupiscence is to make something to be voluntary.' (Summa Theologica, Part II, Q.6.) Preached at the Rolls Chapel'), points out that 'Benevolence towards particular persons may be to a degree of weakness, and so be blamable', but here the note of self-indulgence sounds too loud. And Nowell-Smith, Ethics, 243ff., describes many cases of incontinence where we are overcome by conscience or duty: 'We might paradoxically, but not unfairly,
say that in such a case it is difficult to resist the temptation to tell the truth. We are the slaves of our own consciences.'
Slaves don't act freely; the case is again not clear.
Aristotle discusses the case of the man who, contrary to his own principle (and best judgement) pursues (too strongly) something noble and good (he cares too much for honour or his children), but he refuses to call this incontinence (Nic. Eth., 1148).
(15) For a version of this theory, see Essay 1. 
